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FINDING ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS:
HOW THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION IN CASES WITH SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN
RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS AFFECTS MINING AND
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIES
REBECCA C. GRIFFIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the federal circuits are split over whether foreign
relations implications can create federal question jurisdiction in cases where
only state law claims appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint. To
avoid negatively affecting foreign relations, the majority of U.S. circuits
have broadened federal jurisdiction over cases involving significant foreign
relations implications. Litigants involved in cases with foreign relations
implications, like agriculture and natural resource corporations in resource-
dependent or agrarian-based countries, benefit from this majority position
because federal court is generally a more favorable forum for foreign,
corporate litigants.' Other circuits, specifically the Ninth Circuit, have
decreased access to federal courts, thereby depriving such agriculture and
natural resource corporations of a more favorable forum and potentially
endangering U.S. foreign relations.
This split in the federal circuits substantially impacts mining and
agriculture corporations operating both within the United States and abroad.
Such corporations operating in countries heavily dependent upon natural
resource and agriculture industries often have great influence over the
economy and the government of foreign nations. For this reason, the
litigation in which these types of corporations are involved can have serious
foreign relations implications. The majority of federal circuits have
recognized this fact. They have sought to protect U.S. foreign relations by
* Note Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2011-2012. J.D. expected 2012, University of Kentucky, College of Law, M.A. 2010, University
of Kentucky, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, B.A. 2008, University of
Kentucky.
1 See Stephan B. Burbank, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1469 (2008) (illustrating the "growing popular view that
the federal courts favored business interests" in the twentieth century); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet
Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REv. 1, n. 117 ("It is commonly reported that business
defendants almost always attempt to remove [a case to federal court] to gain a more favorable forum.")
(internal quotations omitted).
KY J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
allowing such litigants access to the federal courts when the outcome of
their case may potentially impact foreign relations, regardless whether a
federal issue appears in the well-pleaded compliant. If a suit is brought in
the Ninth Circuit, however, a mining or agriculture corporation, or a nation
protecting such a corporation, will be denied access to federal courts and
may be less able to protect its interests and the interests of the threatened
industry.
This note examines the split in the circuits over whether federal
question jurisdiction exists in all cases involving the federal common law of
foreign relations. First, the note presents the circuit split in more detail. The
next section discusses broadly the relationship between federal question
jurisdiction and the federal common law on foreign relations. The analysis
then dissects the majority's view and Ninth Circuit's view on the
relationship between federal question jurisdiction and the federal common
law on foreign relations. After examining the circuit split, the note
examines the implications of how the Ninth Circuit's application of federal
question jurisdiction affects mining and agriculture corporations. Finally,
the piece will conclude by arguing against the Ninth circuit's interpretation
of the federal common law on foreign relations. The majority position, that
federal subject matter jurisdiction exists when foreign relations are
implicated defensively, is the proper interpretation because it upholds the
objectives of the federal common law on foreign relations and safeguards
the stability of U.S. foreign relations.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The issue among the circuits is whether federal question
jurisdiction exists when the federal common law of foreign relations is only
employed defensively or is not apparent on the face of the well-pleaded
complaint. Recently, the Provincial Government of Marinduque filed a
complaint in Nevada state court under Philippine law against a Canadian
Minority shareholder of the Marcopper Mining Corporation.2 The minority
shareholder, Placer Dome, Inc., attempted to remove the case to the federal
court system, causing the plaintiff to challenge federal subject matter
jurisdiction.3 The Ninth Circuit found that federal subject matter
jurisdiction did not exist because the act of state doctrine, which is part of
the federal common law on foreign relations, was "implicated . . . only
defensively and the complaint [did not] necessarily raise a stated federal
2 Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).
3 id
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issue, actually disputed and substantial."4 The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case back to Nevada state court.
Had this case arisen in another jurisdiction, it is likely that the case
would have remained in the federal court system. The key question is
"whether the federal common law of foreign relations can provide subject-
matter jurisdiction in situations such as this where a foreign plaintiffs
complaint raises only state law claims." 6  The few courts that have
addressed this question have produced conflicting responses.7 The Second,
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits interpret the federal common law on foreign
relations to confer jurisdiction when the "complaint substantially affects a
foreign country's sovereign interests."8 The content of the plaintiffs well-
pleaded complaint does not serve as the dispositive factor in deciding
whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists.9 This interpretation of
federal question jurisdiction suggests that jurisdiction exists in a case where
a mining or agriculture corporation operates in a nation that is highly
dependent on the corporation's operations. Such a corporation would be
able to remove a case against it from state court and access the federal
courts even though a federal issue was not apparent on the face of the well-
pleaded complaint.
The Ninth Circuit responded to this application of the common law
of foreign relations with criticism.' 0 In Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251
F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit was "particularly troubled
by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pacheco de Perez [v. AT & T Co., 139
F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (11th Cir.1998),] that federal jurisdiction hinged upon
whether a foreign government has taken a position in support or in
opposition to the litigation."" The Ninth Circuit denied subject matter
jurisdiction in Patrickson and justified its position by stating,
Congress has not . . . extend[ed] federal-question
jurisdiction to all suits where the federal common law of
foreign relations might arise as an issue. . . We therefore
decline to follow [Republic ofPhilippines vJ Marcos, [806
F.2d 344, 352 (2d Cir. 1986)], Torres [v. S. Peru Copper
4 Id. at 1090 (citation omitted).
5Id. at 1093.
6 A.A.Z.A. v. Doe Run Res. Corp., No. 4:07CV1874 CDP, 2008 WL 748328, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 18, 2008).
7 id.
8 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4, Placer Dome, Inc. v. Provincial Gov't of Marinduque,
2010 WL 545707 (U.S. Feb. 10, 2010) (No. 09-944).
9 See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997); Pacheco de
Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1998); Sequihau v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F.Supp.
61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
'o A.A.Z.A., 2008 WL 748328, at *2.
" Id. at *3.
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Corp., 113 F.3d 540, (5th Cir. 1997)] and Pacheco de
Perez insofar as they stand for the proposition that the
federal courts may assert jurisdiction over a case simply
because a foreign government has expressed a special
interest in its outcome. 12
The Ninth Circuit refused to allow "courts- state or federal- [to] tailor their
rulings to accommodate the expressed interest of a foreign nation that is not
even a party."
III. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
To understand how the circuit split affects access to the federal
courts, it is necessary to understand two separate but interconnected
doctrines: federal question jurisdiction and the federal common law on
foreign relations. The split among the circuits implicates the relationship
between these two doctrines.
Constitutionally, United States federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and may hear only certain types of cases. 14 Federal jurisdiction
must exist independently of the wishes of the parties; it will not exist based
upon the opposing parties consent to litigate their case in federal court."
Congress, however, may confer jurisdiction on them through statutes.16
Congress exercised this power granting the federal courts federal question
jurisdiction to hear "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."1 If a case involves or is contingent upon "a
substantial question of federal law," a federal court may hear the case.
Additionally, the federal interest or question must be within the well-
pleaded complaint. 19 It is a well-established rule that the federal courts will
only "have jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court,
only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that
federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law." 20
12 Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2001).
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
1 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352 (2d Cir. 1986).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
17 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
1 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
19 Anna von Franqu6, Comment, Pineapples, Presidents and the Federal Courts: A Defense
of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations and a New Framework for its Application, 35 Sw. U.
L. Rev. 253, 257 (2006).
20 Marcos, 806 F.2d at 352 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. 463 U.S. at 27-28).
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Determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists becomes
complicated when a case invokes the federal common law on foreign
relations (FCLFR). Now, generally, "there is no federal general common
law" under Eerie R. Co. v. Tompkins,21 but the federal courts develop
"specialized federal common law" in rare circumstances.22 This usually
only arises in "areas where unique considerations demand that federal law
supplant state law."23 Federal question jurisdiction, for example, may exist
when a complaint only puts forth state law claims if the case raises issues
implicating the FCLFR, because "while the federal common law can create
substantive law. .. it can also create a basis for federal jurisdiction." 24
The FCLFR became an area of specialized federal common law
because of the uniquely federal nature of international relations. 25 First,
FCLFR is "federal" to the extent that cases involving foreign relations
invoke separation of powers issues.26 The Constitution confers the
responsibility of conducting foreign relations on the national executive.27
Second, FCLFR is uniquely federal because there is an obvious need for
uniformity in the area of foreign relations.28 Allowing the state courts to
delve into foreign relations could disrupt U.S. relations or endanger U.S.
interests. The importance of international relations led the U.S. Supreme
Court to officially recognize a federal common law of foreign relations in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.29 As the Ninth Circuit succinctly
summarized, while "there is no general federal common law, there are
enclaves of federal judge-made law. One such enclave concerns the law of
international relations and foreign affairs."3 o
These two legal doctrines, federal question jurisdiction and FCLFR,
have an interesting and ambiguous relationship. In most circuits, the
FCLFR may create federal jurisdiction when there are "foreign relations
implications."3  Foreign relations implications could arise, for instance,
when a court must rule on the validity of a foreign state's action or when a
foreign state has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation.32
Several very strong justifications support allowing federal
jurisdiction to arise in such situations. These justifications "can be divided
21 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
22 Paul S. Ryerson, Inconsistent Inconsistency: A Comment on Arrested Development of the
Federal Common Law ofForeign Relations, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 789, 790 (2004).
23 id.
24 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 256.
26 Franqu, supra note 19, at 256.
26 See Franqu6, supra note 19, at 264.
21 U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
28 id
29 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
30 Placer Dome Inc. v. Provincial Gov't of Marinduque, 582 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted).
31 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 284.
32 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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into three main categories: considerations of sovereignty, practical
considerations, and constitutional issues." Accepting the acts of a foreign
state is an essential part of respecting the sovereignty of a foreign nation. A
commonly accepted principle states that "every sovereign State is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State."34 The
consequences of disregarding this general principle "could seriously
interfere with negotiations being carried on by the Executive Branch and
might prevent or render less favorable the terms of an agreement that could
otherwise be reached."35 The practical consideration that supports federal
question jurisdiction in cases with foreign relations implications is the
inherent need for uniformity regarding the U.S. government interactions
with other nations. The FCLFR, therefore, "should not be left to divergent
and perhaps parochial state interpretations."3 6  Lastly, constitutional
concerns lean in favor of asserting federal jurisdiction. The power to
conduct foreign relations resides with the Executive, and the U.S. courts
must adjudicate in such a way that it does not infringe upon the powers of
the Executive. Cases involving the FCLFR, therefore, have "constitutional
underpinnings" because the circumstances raise separation of powers
*37issues.
Although several justifications exist for asserting federal question
jurisdiction in cases involving the FCLFR, complaints in cases that
"inevitably give rise to a defense involving a substantial federal question do
not pass . . . [the well-pleaded complaint] test." 3 8 It may not be apparent on
the face of the complaint whether litigation will affect a foreign
government's act or a foreign interest. Yet, many federal circuits have still
found federal question jurisdiction to exist.39 The following describes the
gradual expansion of federal question jurisdiction in cases involving
FCLFR.
During the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations in the 1960s, the
U.S. Supreme Court accepted and endorsed the FCLFR in Sabbatino.40 In
1960, an American broker purchased sugar, to be delivered later that year,
from a U.S. owned corporation operating in Cuba.41 After the contract was
formed, the U.S. Congress limited its sugar quota from Cuba, provoking the
Cuban government to respond to what it perceived as an "act of
aggression."42 Cuba began nationalizing U.S. owned property and
33 Franque, supra note 19, at 259.
34 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416.
" Id. at 432.
36 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 258 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425).
3 Id. at 259 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423).
3 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 257.
3 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401-03.
40 Id. at 401.
41 Id.
42 id.
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companies within its territory, including the U.S. owned sugar corporation
involved in the previously mentioned sugar contract.43 The same American
brokers made the same purchase agreement with the now nationalized
corporation, and the nationalized corporation delivered the sugar to the
American broker." The American brokers then refused to give the
proceeds of the sale to the now Cuban-owned corporation, causing the
Cuban government to bring a conversion claim in U.S. federal courts. 45
The Sabbatino court found that it could not adjudicate the matter
because doing so would require determining the validity of a foreign
sovereign's actions, specifically the nationalization of the sugar
corporation.46 The Supreme Court was not ready to allow the U.S. courts to
"sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its
own territory." 47
While the Sabbatino case did not hinge upon whether federal
question jurisdiction existed, it had important implications for the
relationship between federal question jurisdiction and the FCLFR.
Sabbatino claimed that because a controversial international issue was the
basis of the complaint, specifically the expropriation of U.S. property by a
foreign government, federal law was implicated. So, even though "it would
have been possible for the court to decide the case without visiting the issue
of federal common law, the court was constrained to make it clear that an
issue concerned with the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relations with other members of the
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal
law.,48 This was only the start of the expansion of the doctrine on federal
question jurisdiction.
IV. THE MAJORITY VIEW ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL
QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS
Throughout the years the doctrine of federal question jurisdiction
has expanded. More and more situations arose in which the FCLFR would
create federal question jurisdiction. Jurisdiction ultimately depends on
whether a complaint, which only stipulates state-based claims but has
foreign relations implications, produces federal jurisdiction.49 Most federal
43 Id at 401 n.3.
4 Id. at 404.
45 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 406.
4 Id. at 439.
47 Id. at 424 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
48 Franqub, supra note 19, at 258-259 (citation omitted).
49 A.A.Z.A. v. Doe Run Res. Corp., No. 4:07CV1874 CDP, 2008 WL 748328, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 18, 2008).
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circuits, including but not limited to the Second, Fifth and Eleventh, would
answer this query affirmatively, arguing that federal question jurisdiction
inherently exists if state-based claims substantially impact foreign relations.
Other circuits, namely the Ninth, would disagree completely, believing that
federal question jurisdiction must emerge from the face of the complaint
and cannot be raised defensively. The former view will be considered for
the remainder of this section while the latter will be discussed in the next
section.
The Second Circuit adopted an expansive view of federal question
jurisdiction in cases involving the FCLFR and helped to expand the
doctrine.o In Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, former Philippine dictator
Ferdinand Marcos purportedly came into possession of "five properties in
New York . . . allegedly purchased . . . from the proceeds of money and
assets stolen from the Philippine government."5 In analyzing federal
subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit explained that it must
examine the "well-pleaded complaint" in order to determine whether the
claims made rely on some federal law.52 The court conceded that the
complaint must be analyzed "separate and apart from any defenses that the
defendants have asserted or might assert in the future" when trying to
determine whether federal question jurisdiction exists.5 3
Despite these rules and the fact that "on the face of the complaint . .
the plaintiff brought this case under a theory more nearly akin to a state
cause of action for conversion," the Second Circuit found that federal
question jurisdiction existed. 54 The court stated that a "well-pleaded
complaint" might be read or examined in two different ways. 5 If a state
cause of action involves an area where state law has been preempted by
federal law then federal question jurisdiction may exist.56 In deciding
Marcos, the court examined "whether the federal common law in the area
of foreign affairs is so 'powerful,' or important, as to displace a purely state
cause of action of constructive trust." 57 The Second Circuit decided that
FCLFR in this case was powerful enough; "an action brought by a foreign
government against its former head of state arises under federal common
law because of the necessary implication of such an action for United States
relations."s Essentially, this judgment is based upon two grounds; "the
action had 'necessary implications... for United States foreign relations'
so See Marcos, 806 F.2d 344.
' Id. at 348.
52Id. at 352.
53 id.
5
4 Id. at 354.
55 Id.
56 Marcos, 806 F.2d at 354.
5
id
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because it was both brought by a foreign government against a foreign head
of state,' and the outcome would directly affect compliance with the
diplomatic request of a foreign sovereign." 59
The ruling in Marcos expanded federal question jurisdiction in the
FCLFR context a degree because it allowed for jurisdiction over purely
state law claims and paved the way for future expansion. The case,
however, still involved strong and obvious foreign relations implications
because the post-Marcos Philippine government was a litigant in the case
and the case hinged upon acts of the Marcos Government.o Subsequent
cases have expanded federal question jurisdiction to apply in cases where
the foreign relations implications were both less obvious and less direct.
Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., came out of the Fifth
Circuit and expanded federal question jurisdiction even more.6 1 The case
involved Peruvian plaintiffs who brought suit against a copper smelting and
refining company, which was incorporated in Delaware and had its
principal place of business in Peru.62 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the federal
district court's finding that there was federal question jurisdiction despite
the fact that the plaintiffs complaint only involved claims based in state
law.63 Once aware of the suit, Peru, as a sovereign nation, contacted the
U.S. State Department to protest the litigation because it "implicate[d] some
of its most vital interests, and hence, will affect its relations with the United
States."6 The court heavily considered and examined the foreign relations
implicated in pursuing litigation against the mining corporation:
The mining industry in Peru, of which SPCC [the
corporation involved in the litigation] is the largest
company, is critical to that country's economy,
contributing up to 50% of its export income and 11% of its
gross domestic product. Furthermore, the Peruvian
government has participated substantially in the activities
for which SPCC is being sued. By way of example, the
government: (1) owns the land on which SPCC operates;
(2) owns the minerals which SPCC extracts; (3) owned
the... refinery [involved in the litigation] from 1975 until
1994, during which time pollution from the refinery may
have contributed to the injuries complained of by the
plaintiffs; and (4) grants concessions that allow SPCC to
s9 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 260 (citation omitted).
60 See generally Marcos, 806 F.2d 344.
61 Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540.62 Id at 541, 543.63 Id. at 543.
6 Id. at 542.
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operate in return for an annual fee. Moreover, the
government extensively regulates the mining industry.65
The court's rationale for maintaining federal question jurisdiction was that
the cause of action "strikes not only at vital economic interest but also at
Peru's sovereign interests by seeking damages for activities and policies in
which the government actively has been engaged." 66
The Fifth Circuit essentially deemed that the text of the complaint
was not dispositive with the respect to whether federal question jurisdiction
existed because it granted jurisdiction based on a complaint that contained
no claims that independently satisfied the requirements of federal question
jurisdiction.67 The court, rather, examined the nature of the complaint and
determined that "the plaintiffs complaint raise[d] substantial questions of
federal common law by implicating important policy concerns" alone.68
The Torres case built on the expansion of the Marcos case. Now, federal
question jurisdiction based on the FCLFR may arise over state claims even
if a foreign government is not involved in the litigation; it need only have a
vital economic interest in the outcome of the litigation. This would be
sufficient to create federal question jurisdiction and removal from state
courts. 69
As demonstrated, Torres, Marcos, and other case law broadened
the situations in which federal question jurisdiction exists, but there are
limits to the doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit in Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T
Co. adopted the rules set down in Torres but limited them important ways.70
The defendant telecommunications company in Pacheco had been laying
fiber-optic cable in Tejerias, Venezuela; while digging the trench for the
cable, an excavating machine struck a gas pipeline, which caused an
explosion that injured the plaintiffs. 7 ' The plaintiffs filed two actions, one in
state court and the other in a federal district court.72 The federal district
court consolidated the actions and dismissed them on the basis of forum non
conviens." On appeal, the Eleventh confronted the issue of whether or not
"the district should have remanded the case back to Georgia state court for
lack of federal jurisdiction."7 4 One of the many grounds asserted for federal
jurisdiction was that the FCLFR created federal question jurisdiction over
61 Id. at 543.
66 id.
67 Torres, 13 F.3d at 542-43.6
1 Id at 543.
69 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 261.
'o Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1998).
71 Id at 1371.
72 id.
7 Id.
74 id.
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the case.75 The Eleventh recognized that "the Fifth Circuit has extended the
area of federal jurisdiction based on the federal common law of foreign
relations to disputes between private parties that implicate the 'vital
economic and sovereign interests' of the nation where the parties' dispute
arose."76 In failing to find federal question jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit
accepted the Fifth Circuit's legal principle but limited its application in
certain situations, such as if the foreign "interest in the plaintiffs action is
too speculative and tenuous to confer federal jurisdiction over the case."77
The Eleventh Circuit limited the doctrine by saying that "while a case that
strikes at the heart of the economic and sovereign interests of a foreign
nation will be covered by the FCLFR, one that has too little economic effect
on the sovereign, or too loose a connection with sovereign interest will fall
outside this grant of federal jurisdiction."7 The court justified its decision
in Pacheco by saying that, in stark contrast to Torres, there was "no
evidence regarding the relative importance of the fiber-optic cable project,
or the telecommunications industry in general, to the Venezuelan national
economy." 79
The Fifth Circuit, a year prior to Pacheco, similarly restricted
Torres in Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A. G.80 In Marathon, the defendant,
a German gas supplier, argued that its role in the German economy would
implicate the FCLFR and create federal question jurisdiction." The Fifth
Circuit said that federal question jurisdiction based on FCLFR did not exist
in this particular case because the outcome of litigation would probably not
"impact severely the vital economic interests of a highly developed and
flourishing industrial nation such as Germany." 82
Despite the limits imposed in Pacheco de Perez and Marathon Oil
Co., the recent expansion in the law on federal question jurisdiction is
significant. It provides companies that play a substantial role in foreign
economies with greater access to the federal courts, or at least more access
than other companies. Mining and agriculture companies, especially in less
developed, resource-dependent or agrarian-based countries, find themselves
in a position to take advantage of these new legal developments. These
companies often command great influence over vital sectors of economies
and over foreign governments themselves. They are more able than most
companies to demonstrate to the federal circuits that the litigation in which
7s Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1372.
6 Id. at 1377.
7 Id. at 1378.
7 Franqu6, supra note 19, at 261-62 (quoting Pacheco, 139 F.3d at 1377).
7 Pacheco, 139 F.3d at 1378.
so Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other
grounds, 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
81 Id.
82 id
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they are involved will have significant implications on foreign relations. If,
however, such a company finds itself in litigation before the Ninth Circuit,
it will not be able to take advantage of these recent developments and will
not be able to remove the entire case into the federal court system.
V. THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPLICATION OF FEDERAL QUESTION
JURISDICTION IN CASES INVOLVING THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Ninth Circuit diverged from the typical application of the
federal question jurisdiction in cases involving the federal common law on
foreign relations, first in Patrickson v. Dole Food Company and recently in
Provincial Government of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc. Placer
emerged due to mining operations occurring on the Philippine island of
Marinduque between 1964 and 1997.83 This particular island was rich in
valuable mineral resources, including copper and gold.8 4 Hoping to profit
from these natural resources, the defendant, Placer Dome, Inc. (PDI), a
Canadian corporation, constructed the Tapian Pit mining site on the island
of Marinduque. The Provincial Government of the island brought suit
against PDI, arguing that the PDI site was illegally within the Torrijos
Watershed Forest Reserve, and that PDI procured access to the land by
using its influence over President Ferdinand Marcos. 86 The Government
contended that PDI provided President Marcos with a "forty percent interest
in Marcopper, a shell company created to extract the copper," and that
Marcos in return granted PDI access to the protected lands.
The plaintiff also alleged that the PDI operations polluted a key
Marinduque water source and fishery by funneling its "acid mine drainage"
into the Boac River, Mogpog River and Calancan Bay." According to the
plaintiffs, the dumps were hazardous to the residents because they caused
high "levels of cadium, copper, zinc, lead, and mercury in the bay's fish,
and unacceptably high levels of lead in the blood of local residents." 89
These conditions, according to the plaintiff, continued to harm the
Marinduquenos who "continue to use the river to irrigate their farms and
hydrate their animals and themselves." 90 Due to PDI's actions, the plaintiffs
brought both tort and contract claims against PDI in the state courts of
8 Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-01299-BES-RJJ, 2008
WL 6915277, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 16, 2008).
84 id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
8 Placer Dome, Inc., 2008 WL 6915277, at *6.
9o Id. at *7.
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Nevada based on the belief that the defendant "conducte[d] significant and
continuous business in the state."91
The defendant responded by moving under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) to
remove the Placer case to the federal courts, alleging that the action
"implicated issues of federal common law to the extent that the propriety of
acts of a foreign state were at issue."92 The Federal District Court of
Nevada granted the motion in favor of the defendant because the complaint
involved the FCLFR, and federal question jurisdiction therefore existed.93
The district court found that the "complaint [was] replete with allegations
regarding the Philippine Government's activities, which contributed to the
environmental harm that Plaintiff has suffered." 94
However, the Ninth Circuit later reversed in part and vacated the
district court's decision after reviewing it de novo.95 The court examined
whether the FCLFR was raised and thus whether the federal district court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1.96 The Ninth Circuit found that the
complaint did not raise these matters, but rather the federal common law of
foreign relations only became implicated via the defense's response; this
was not sufficient to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction because "the
federal question on which jurisdiction is premised cannot be supplied via a
defense; rather, the federal question must be disclosed upon the face of the
compliant, unaided by the answer."97
During its analysis, the Ninth Circuit mentioned Patrickson v. Dole
Food Co., a case it had previously decided. In that case, Costa Rican,
Ecuadorian, Guatemalan, and Panamanian agricultural laborers brought suit
against fruit companies which used dibromochloropropane (DBCP) as a
pesticide on their banana farms and the chemical companies which
manufactured that pesticide. The plaintiffs in that case alleged injuries
from working with DBCP, a substance that can cause "sterility, testicular
atrophy, miscarriages, liver damage, cancer, and other ailments that you
wouldn't wish on anyone." 99 Two formerly government-owned companies
and the Dole Food Company motioned to remove the case to federal court
based on, among other things, federal question jurisdiction. The Dole
Company argued that federal question jurisdiction existed because the case
91 Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).
92 Placer Dome, Inc., 2008 WL 6915277, at * 1.
93 Id. at *2.
94 Placer, 582 F.3d at 1090.
9s Id.
6 Id. at 1087.
97 Id. at 1086 (quoting Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974) (per
curiam)).
98 Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001).
9 Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798.
10Id.
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revolved around "a vital sector of the economies of foreign countries and so
has implications for our nation's relations with those countries."'0 ' Dole's
underlying theory was that a judgment against it and the other multinational
corporations involved in the litigation would detrimentally impact the
banana industry - "one of the most import sectors of those [four] countries'
-,,102economies.
There was plenty of case law and precedent to support Dole's
argument. The Ninth Circuit cited the cases mentioned above, including
Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T
Co., and Republic of Philippines v. Marcos.'03 All of those cases asserted
that the federal common law on foreign relations may be invoked simply
when the outcome of the litigation could potentially affect a vital sector of a
foreign nation's economy. However, in Patrickson, the Ninth Circuit held
that "even if the case turns entirely on the validity of a federal defense,
federal courts may not assert jurisdiction unless a federal right or immunity
is an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiffs cause of action."'0 The
workers of those four Latin American countries brought only state court
claims, including "negligence, conspiracy, strict liability, intentional torts,
and breach of implied warranty." 05 The Ninth Circuit stressed none of
these causes of action related to a federal or constitutional right or action
and could not serve as the basis for federal question jurisdiction.'06
In the later Placer decision, the Ninth Circuit unambiguously
admitted that, in the Patrickson case, it "part[ed] ways with other circuits
that had more broadly interpreted the doctrine as supplying federal-question
jurisdiction over any case that might affect foreign relations regardless of
whether federal law is raised in the complaint." 0 7 The Ninth Circuit
adamantly argued that, "Sabbatino [and the acceptance of a federal
common law on foreign relations] did not create an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule. What Congress has not done is to extend federal-
question jurisdiction to all suits where the federal common law of foreign
relations might arise as an issue."s0 8 The court found that federal courts did
not have jurisdiction to rule on the Placer matter despite the governmental
involvement,' 09 which included the following:
'0 Id. at 800.
o2 id.
'0 Id. at 801.
104 Id. at 799 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11
(1983)).
1o5 Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 799.
106 Id. at 804-05.
107 Placer, 582 F.3d at 1089 (emphasis added).
10 Id at 1089-90 (emphasis added) (citing Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 801-02).
1'0 Placer, 582 F.3d at 1090-91.
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(1) President Marcos overturned a presidential proclamation to
allow mining in a forest reserve;
(2) Marcos, and subsequent to his removal, a presidential
commission, owned 49 percent of the shares in Marcopper, a
subsidiary of Placer Dome;
(3) Marcos ordered a government commission to issue a permit
allowing Marcopper to dump toxic tailing into Calancan Bay;
(4) Marcos ordered the same pollution commission to remove
restraints it had placed on Marcopper's dumping of waste into the
bay; and
(5) President Aquino ordered a pollution control board not to
enforce a cease and desist order against Marcopper. 110
The Ninth Circuit declined to recognize federal jurisdiction when the
complaint refers to the "government's complicity in the claimed damage to
the Marinduquenos" and alleged illegal activities."'
The Ninth Circuit essentially based its Placer decision on two
grounds. First, it said that federal question jurisdiction did not exist because
the issue was only raised defensively.1 12 Second, it claimed no federal
jurisdiction existed because the government acts involved were not
substantial enough to trigger the federal common law on foreign
relations. 13 In order for there to be federal question jurisdiction and, thus,
removal power in cases involving FCLFR in the Ninth Circuit, there needs
to be "more" than "a general invocation of international law or foreign
relations."ll 4 The Ninth Circuit argued that the previous list of government
actions was not truly essential to the complaint. In order to find Placer
Dome guilty, it was not necessary, according to the Ninth Circuit, to
invalidate the acts of the government of Marinduque.
The first rationale is of more importance for the purposes of this
analysis. The Ninth Circuit unambiguously explained that jurisdiction did
not exist in Placer simply because the "doctrine [was] implicated. . . only
defensively and the complaint [did] not necessarily raise a stated federal
issue actually disputed and substantial."" 5 The Ninth Circuit not only
rejected the majority view on the relationship between federal question
"o Id. at 1090.
" Id. at 1091.
" 2 Id. at 1086.
' Id. at 1091.
114 id
1s Placer, at 1090 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005)).
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jurisdiction and FCLFR, but also criticized the other circuits for expanding
federal jurisdiction in cases involving FCLFR. The Ninth Circuit equated
the other circuit's recognition of federal jurisdiction in cases involving
FCLFR to "tailor[ing] their rulings to accommodate a non-party"
country. 116  The Ninth Circuit disapproved of the Eleventh Circuits
consideration, in Pacheco, of foreign opposition to litigation,117 saying that
the "effect of. . . litigation on the economies of foreign countries is of
absolutely no consequence to our jurisdiction."'1 8
The Ninth Circuit's minority view deprives mining and agriculture
companies, which substantially impact the vital economic sectors in certain
countries, of access into the U.S. federal courts. The minority view seems to
be in conflict with many practical considerations. For instance, the Ninth
Circuit admitted in Patrickson that certain areas of the federal common law
on foreign relations, specifically the act of state doctrine, "generally serves
as a defense." 1 9 Also in Patrickson, the Ninth Circuit stated that "the
common law of foreign relations will become an issue only when-and-if-it
is raised as a defense."1 20 A plaintiff suing one of these countries is not
likely to mention the foreign relations implications in the complaint if he or
she prefers to litigate in state court. The Ninth Circuit's bar against
defensively raised foreign relations implications would prevent cases based
on state court claims to enter federal court, even if there were substantial
and potentially disastrous consequences for foreign relations. If the Circuits
do not allow for a degree of leniency with respect to the well-pleaded
complaint rule and the doctrine of federal question jurisdiction, they may
very well jeopardize U.S. relations and interests abroad.
Moreover, in its Patrickson decision, the court doubted whether
"foreign relations are an appropriate consideration at all" and asserted that
"the relevant question is not whether the foreign government is pleased or
displeased by the litigation, but how the case affects the interest of the
United States." 2 1 It appears that the Ninth Circuit has attempted to
bifurcate foreign relations by considering only how litigation would affect
U.S. interests and disregarding the position of a foreign government. To
appropriately consider whether U.S. interests will be adversely affected by
a certain case, the courts must take into consideration how a foreign
government will act or respond. It is the foreign government's response that
will affect U.S. interests. 12 2 It is a simple truth that if litigation will
negatively impact a vital industry or sector of a foreign economy, there is a
116 Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803.
'17 Pacheco, 139 F.3d at 1378.
118 Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 804.
"'9 Id. at 800 n. 2.
120 Id. at 800.
121 Id. at 804.
122 See, id. at 804.
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probability that the outcome of the litigation will negatively affect U.S.
interests, especially in the global economic crisis in which we now find
ourselves. To ignore this fact is to undermine the whole purpose of certain
areas of the federal common law of foreign relations.
VI. IMPACT OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON MINING AND AGRICULTURAL
INDUSTRIES
As demonstrated, there is no consensus on the relationship between
federal question jurisdiction and FCLFR. The rules governing these
doctrines are not uniformly applied throughout the federal circuits. The
question now becomes how significant the circuit split will be to those in
the mining and agricultural industries or to those in litigation with such
corporate entities. There is some debate about whether the ability to keep
suits in federal courts really impacts the outcome of litigation. According to
the Ninth Circuit, the denial of federal jurisdiction does not have a
substantial impact on the outcome of a case: the fact that "the case is
litigated in federal court, rather than state court, will not reduce the impact
of the case on the foreign government." 123 The Ninth Circuit justified its
position, saying "federal judges, like state judges, are bound to decide a
case before them according to the rule of law."l 2 4 The court also stated in
that "if federal courts are so much better suited than state courts for
handling cases that might raise foreign policy concerns, Congress will
surely pass a statute giving. . . [the federal courts] jurisdiction." 2 5 Since
Congress has yet to act on the subject, the Ninth continues to refuse to
recognize federal question jurisdiction in many cases with substantial
foreign relations implications.12 6
Once again, the Ninth Circuit seems to ignore the practical
considerations related to its judgments. Having cases in federal court rather
than state courts can have a substantial impact on litigation. The denial of
federal jurisdiction in these cases allows plaintiffs to "enjoy more relaxed
forum non conveniens standards and avoid higher burdens of proof and the
strict standing requirements of federal court." 27 The Ninth Circuit, in its
criticism of the other circuits, is neglecting the reality that federal
procedural rules not only have a substantial impact on litigation but may, in
fact, be dispositive. The refusal to recognize federal question jurisdiction in
cases involving defensively-raised foreign relations implications will cause
the Ninth Circuit to deny companies, particularly agriculture and mining
123 Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 803.
124 Id
125 Id at 804.
126 Eg, id,
127 Andrew W. Davis, Note, Federalizing Foreign Relations: The Case for Expansive
Federal Jurisdiction in Private International Litigation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1464, 1470 (2005).
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corporations that affect vital sectors of the economies of foreign nations, the
opportunity to take advantage of the more favorable forum to which they
are entitled. Moreover, the refusal potentially jeopardizes U.S. interests and
foreign relations by failing to recognize and consider the interests of foreign
nations in its litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Currently, the "debate over the application of the federal common
law of foreign relations as a basis for federal question jurisdiction"
continues to rage.128 The primary point of contention "is in part a function
of how strictly the well-pleaded complaint rule should apply to cases
implicating foreign relations."1 29 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has adopted the minority position on the subject, refusing to
find federal question jurisdiction in cases involving state-based claims and
defensively-raised foreign relations implications." 0  This position
undermines the objectives of the foreign common law on foreign relations
and endangers U.S. foreign relations. For these reasons, the majority
position is proper, and federal question jurisdiction should exist even when
foreign relations implications are only raised defensively.
Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves this circuit split, agriculture
and natural resource corporations need to be aware of these rules. A
corporation's failure to understand and take advantage of these rules could
deny it access to federal court, which is a more favorable forum in which to
litigate its claims or claims brought against it. If, however, its suit comes
before the Ninth Circuit, access to the federal courts may not ever be an
option.
128 Id. at 1469.
129 Id at 1469.
130 See, e.g., Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 808-09; Placer, 582 F.3d at 1093.
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